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CONTENTS
The expansion of Western European production accelerated in the first half of 1997. Exports were
the main engine, driven by a devaluation of European currencies and strong growth abroad. Domes-
tic demand also picked up somewhat led by investment in machinery and equipment. Inflation re-
mained at low levels. However, in most countries the bottom seems to have been reached. One
major concern is the rise in import prices. The upswing will further gain momentum in the coming
months and in 1998 as conditions shaping the cycle remain favorable. Real GDP in Western Europe
will increase by 3 percent in 1998.
Under the assumption that the decision concerning EMU due in spring 1998 is made in favor of a
large monetary union, those countries with relatively high short-term interest rates will lower them
quite substantially in next year. Against the background of high unemployment, countries with low
interest rates will not raise key interest rates significantly. As a consequence, monetary policy in
Western Europe on average will be further loosened. This will additionally stimulate economic
activity but also raise risks of inflation.
The major problem in Western Europe is unemployment, which remains stubbornly high or is even
rising. As a contrast, unemployment in the United States has come down to the lowest level since
decades. It is often stated that high unemployment in Europe is due to a restrictive monetary policy,
led by a—supposedly—deflationary policy pursued by the Deutsche Bundesbank. This view, how-
ever, does not find any support when indicators of monetary policy are taken into account. Rather,
they suggest that monetary policy has been expansionary in Europe for some time. In addition, the
reduction of inflation since 1990 has been equally pronounced in Europe and the United States,
which indicates that the monetary stance has not been significantly different. Furthermore, a striking
fact in this regard is that the relatively steep fall of inflation in the United Kingdom was associated
with a significant decline in unemployment.
While total unemployment in Europe has followed an upward trend resulting in an approximate dou-
bling of the rate, there have been notable exceptions within Europe. Among those economies that
have experienced a decline in recent years are the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Ireland;
other countries seem to have joined the club. Overall, a variety of measures has contributed to the
improvement of labor market performance in these countries. They include deregulations of product
and labor markets that have led to wage moderation and more wage differentiation, and reforms of
the tax and transfer systems that have resulted in improved incentives for both labor demand and
labor supply. A central feature of individual countries' experience is that reforms tend to be more
effective when they are comprehensive since there are important synergies between structural re-
forms in different fields.
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The countries in Western Europe are in the fifth
year of the economic upturn. The strength of
the increase in production so far is similar to
the previous recovery in the early 1980s. While
the expansion accelerated during the first half
of 1997, unemployment remained stubbornly
high. However, there have been remarkable dif-
ferences in the performance of national labor
markets.
The European economies have received
strong impulses from abroad. The upswing in
the United States has even gained some
strength. Exports to Asian and Latin American
countries have remained high, and those to
Central and Eastern Europe have increased
rapidly. Domestic demand has been stimulated
by monetary policy: Short-term interest rates
have remained low, and the expansion of mon-
etary aggregates has accelerated. Furthermore,
long-term interest rates have continued to be
low.
During the first half of 1997, exports were
the driving force of the upturn (Figure 1). One
reason was the devaluation of most European
currencies against the dollar. Furthermore, the
competitive position of firms has improved be-
cause of their efforts to increase productivity by
rationalization. But also domestic demand has
accelerated slightly, in particular investment in
machinery and equipment. Private consumption
has stayed on a moderate path since real
disposable income has risen only slightly and
fiscal policy generally has remained restrictive.
Only in a few countries — for example, the
United Kingdom, the Netherlands and the
Scandinavian economies —, consumption of
households has expanded rapidly due to the
improved employment situation.
Inflation in Europe has remained moderate.
However, in most countries the lowest level
seems to have been reached; in a few countries,
the rates already began to creep up again.
While wage costs have been a dampening
factor, import prices have risen markedly.
II. Monetary Policy Will Stimulate Economic Activity in 1998
Monetary policy in Western European coun-
tries has been expansionary for more than two
years now. The future course depends crucially
on the decisions concerning the European Mon-
etary Union (EMU). Our assumption is that
the convergence criteria will be interpreted
generously so that EMU will start on January 1,
1999 with a large number of countries. Only
four countries will probably not participate in
the early stage: Due to the substantial deviation
from all reference values, Greece will almost
certainly stay out; furthermore, the United
Kingdom, Denmark and possibly also Sweden
do not want to join the monetary union from
the start. It was announced in last September
that at the same time the member countries will
be nominated, the bilateral conversion ex-
change rates will also be fixed.
These decisions will have important conse-
quences for monetary policy in the near future.
In particular, the monetary union will de facto
start already in May 1998. This means that
short-term interest rates can be equalized
immediately after the decision without any risk
of major exchange rate movements (Scheide
and Solveen 1997a). Countries that currently
have relatively high interest rates can lower
them substantially to the level prevailing at that
time in low-interest rates countries such as
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as rates in EU countries currently differ mark-
edly (Table 1). Italy, Spain and Portugal, but
also Ireland, will have ample room for re-
ductions. These expansionary measures will
most likely not be compensated by interest rate
hikes in the other countries. A substantial in-
crease of key interest rates in Germany, France
and other countries is not likely because of
strong resistance in the light of high unemploy-
ment. On the whole, therefore, monetary policy
will become more stimulative in 1998. As this
will be the fourth year of an expansionary
course, the inflationary risk in Europe will in-
crease. It should become visible soon because
capacity utilization goes up to its normal level
or even beyond that in most countries; further-
more, import prices will increase substantially
as European currencies will continue to be
weak, and finally, raw material prices will
advance considerably because of the strong
growth of world output.
This outlook will leave a tough decision for
the European Central Bank (ECB) in 1999: Key
interest rates will have to be raised markedly if
the ECB wants to establish a reputation of
setting a priority for price level stability. As a
consequence, economic activity in Western
Europe would be dampened considerably.
III. Fiscal Policy Will Cease to Be Restrictive
Fiscal policy in most countries is intended to
achieve the reference value of 3 percent for the
deficit-to-GDP ratio in 1997; therefore, rev-
enues were raised and expenditures were cut,
often considerably. Thus, the overall stance of
fiscal policy is restrictive in the current year,
which is decisive for the evaluation of fiscal
policies and the decision on EMU membership.
The thrust can best be measured by a reduction
of the structural deficit, which is expected to
amount to a little more than 1 percent of GDP
for the EU countries as a whole. While this is
somewhat higher than in previous years, it has
to be kept in mind that part of this decline is
due to one-off or bookkeeping measures that do
not have the full negative impact on economic
activity.
In 1998, fiscal policy will leave its restrictive
course although there will probably not be a
turnaround because the budget deficits will not
be allowed to rise substantially. Nevertheless,
the efforts of consolidation will weaken be-
cause the budget deficits will tend to decline
for cyclical reasons as, for example, tax rev-
enues will increase faster. While most countries
will try to keep the deficit ratio below the 3 per-
cent level in order to consolidate budgets
further, it is not likely that new measures will
be taken if it becomes likely in the later course
of 1998 that the 3 percent target cannot be
achieved. The reason is that after the decision
on the member states of the European Monetary
Union is made, an important element of fiscal
discipline will be missing: The possible threat
that has so far been the exclusion from EMU
will not exist anymore. The sanction mecha-
nism of the stability pact is much weaker and
therefore hardly an incentive for fiscal disci-
pline (Scheide and Solveen 1997b). In addition,
the political will to fully apply the mechanism
of the stability pact could be undermined if a
significant number of countries has problems in
keeping the deficit ratio below 3 percent.IV. Strong Upswing in 1998
The upswing in Western Europe will strengthen
further. The impulses from abroad will con-
tinue to stimulate export activity. While the ex-
pansion in North America will slow down
slightly, growth in most other regions of the
world economy remains high. We expect world
GDP to increase by 4.25 percent in 1998, after
4 percent this year. Consequently, the volume
of world trade will expand rapidly (8 percent in
1997 and 1998). The conditions for a strength-
ening of domestic demand are also favorable.
Monetary policy will become even more ex-
pansionary as short-term interest rates will
converge at a low level. Finally, fiscal policy
will leave its restrictive course in 1998, so there
will hardly be a dampening effect on economic
activity from this side.
On the whole, real GDP in Western Europe
will increase by about 3 percent in 1998 (Table
2). There will be no major differences in the
growth rates as those countries that were still
lagging — Italy is an example — will also
recover. Inflation rates are likely to move up
slightly; the average increase in the consumer
price index (CPI) will be about half a per-
centage point higher in 1998 than in 1997. This
is due to the continued expansionary course of
monetary policy, which leads to higher capacity
utilization; its normal level will, in general, be
reached in the course of 1998, and in several
countries it will even increase beyond that. The
behavior of unemployment has been strikingly
different so far; while this will continue, we
nevertheless expect a decline also for Western
Europe as a whole. The improved outlook for
employment will also stimulate private con-
sumption, which will expand much faster in
1998 than in previous years (Table 3). Invest-
ment will also rise faster than in 1996 and in
1997. This is particularly true for investment in
machinery and equipment. However, construc-
tion expenditures will go up only moderately
also because of the cuts in government spend-
ing on infrastructure.


















































































































































































































































































Source: OECD (1997a), own calculations and forecasts.
V. Germany: Export Boom Fosters Growth
The cyclical upswing in Germany gained mo-
mentum in the course of the first half of 1997.
1
In the second quarter, real GDP increased at an
annual rate of 4 percent, after 1 percent in the
first quarter. However, despite the strong re-
covery the labor market has not yet improved.
The number of employees continued to decline
— albeit at a slower rate — and unemployment
rose. Inflation went up in the middle of the
year, consumer prices were about 2 percent
higher than a year ago. The recovery is still
export-led, domestic demand hardly contributed
to growth. The export boom is mainly due to
the strengthening of economic activity in Ger-
many's main trading partner countries. More-
over, the significant devaluation of the D-Mark
has markedly improved the competitiveness of
German firms.
Due to increasing demand from abroad, ca-
pacity utilization in the manufacturing sector
has risen noticeably. The recent order inflow
suggests that this is likely to continue; recently,
orders from abroad have continued to expand
rapidly, but also domestic orders have picked
up somewhat. With a broadening of the re-
covery, capacity utilization in manufacturing
will further increase in the course of next year
and reach a level as high as the one recorded in
1989, i.e., the year before the unification boom.
In the past, high capacity utilization in the
manufacturing sector often coincided with a
marked increase in inflation. As a consequence,
the Bundesbank usually raised its interest rates
significantly which was followed by a slow-
down of economic expansion. However, as the
recent development in the United States shows,
high capacity utilization need not necessarily
lead to an acceleration of inflation.
In order to keep inflation low, the Bundes-
bank will have to shift monetary policy from its
current expansionary course towards a more
neutral stance. In early October, the Bundes-
bank raised the repo rate by 30 basis points to
3.3 %. It is likely that a further increase in
interest rates in the course of 1998 is necessary
to limit the inflationary risks. However, any
ambitions of the Bundesbank for substantial
hikes are likely to be resisted by the other
member countries of the future EMU. After the
decision in May 1998, the Bundesbank will be
no longer able to pursue an independent
monetary policy.
Fiscal policy is strongly aiming to meet the
reference value of the Maastricht Treaty in
1997. For that purpose, taxes and other duties
were raised and expenditures were cut. Recent
data suggest that the fiscal deficit in relation to


























































Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (1997), own forecasts.
year, the solidarity surcharge will be cut by 2
percentage points. This will lead to an income
tax relief of about DM 7 billion. All in all,
fiscal policy will be neutral with respect to eco-
nomic activity next year.
The conditions are favorable that the re-
covery will continue. Throughout 1998, output
growth is likely to remain somewhat higher
than the growth of the production potential (2.2
percent). While the recovery has so far been
mainly export-driven, domestic demand will
gain momentum and significantly contribute to
growth next year. Tax cuts and an improvement
in the labor market will stimulate private con-
sumption. In line with strongly rising profits,
corporate investment will continue to expand
rapidly. Real GDP will increase by about
3 percent in 1998, after a rate of 2.5 percent in
1997. In both years, output growth in East Ger-
many will be somewhat lower than in West
Germany as the drag from construction is more
pronounced there (Table 4). Obviously, the
catching-up process of the new Lander has
come to halt. This is mainly due to the lack of
competitiveness of firms in Eastern Germany as
indicated by, for example, the fact that unit
labor costs are about 25 percent higher than in
Western Germany.
Inflation in Germany is likely to accelerate
slightly from 1.8 percent in 1997 to 2.1 percent
next year. The improvement in the labor market
will be moderate; the number of unemployed is
likely to decline by about 250,000 persons
until the end of next year.
VI. Recovery in France Continues
The economic expansion in France continued in
the first half of 1997 at a moderate pace. Ex-
ports are still the strongest force of the re-
covery. Due to the devaluation of the French
franc — especially against the US dollar and
the pound Sterling — the competitiveness of
exporters improved; furthermore, the upturn in
main trading partner countries stimulated ex-
port growth. Investment activity picked up only
slowly despite low interest rates and improved
sales and profit expectations, the main reason
probably being the low rate of capacity uti-
lization in important sectors. Construction was
weak mainly due to the restrictive policy of the
French government; in particular, public infra-
structure investment was cut. Private consump-
tion practically stagnated reflecting the slow
expansion of real disposable income; the num-
ber of employees was almost unchanged and
wages rose only moderately.
Inflation remained at a moderate level. In
August 1997, the year-over-year increase in
consumer prices amounted to 1.5 percent; pro-
ducer prices even fell. The labor market situ-
ation remained gloomy; despite the recovery,
the rate of unemployment fell only slightly to
12.5 percent in recent months.
The Banque de France has continued to
pursue an expansionary course. This is indi-
cated by the low short-term real interest ratesand the unusually large difference between the
long-term and short-term interest rates. In early
October, key interest rates were raised fol-
lowing the move of the German central bank.
For the beginning of next year, we expect the
Banque de France to again increase short-term
interest rates moderately, in line with the
Deutsche Bundesbank. This does not, however,
imply a change in the policy stance.
In general, the new French government pur-
sues the consolidation course of the previous
government and tries to bring the budget deficit
down to meet the reference value of the
Maastricht Treaty. For this reason, it decided
upon a new package of deficit reduction
measures, which are equivalent to 0.4 percent
of GDP consisting mainly of an increase of cor-
porate taxes and some unspecified expenditure
cuts. Despite the generally unchanged course,
the government will focus more on an active
labor market policy: The government plans to
create several hundred thousand jobs in the
public and private sector by means of subsidies.
These measures are to be financed by a re-
shuffling of funds within the budget, not by
increasing the deficit. In 1998, pressure for
consolidation will continue because one-off
measures — such as the payment of France
Telecom — contributed to the reduction of the
deficit in the current year. Overall the impact of
fiscal policy will be moderately restrictive in
1998.
The recovery will gain momentum in the
coming year. Exports will be stimulated by the
rapid expansion of economic activity in main
trading partner countries. Investment will be
pushed by the low interest rates and increasing
capacity utilization. Private consumption will
also rise — albeit moderately — mainly due to
the improvement of the employment situation.
Real GDP will increase by a little more than
2 percent in 1997 and by about 3 percent in
1998.
Inflation will remain moderate in 1997 with
a year-over-year increase of consumer prices of
about 1.5 percent. In 1998, it will accelerate
due to the strong expansion of economic ac-
tivity and to higher import prices following the
devaluation of the French franc. On average,
the increase in CPI will be around 2 percent
next year.
VII. Expansion of Economic Activity in Italy Will Strengthen
The Italian economy has lagged behind other
Western European economies since 1995 due to
restrictive monetary and fiscal policies. The
strong expansion in the second quarter of 1997
did probably not mark the start of a strong re-
covery since industrial production was mainly
stimulated by public subsidies of new car
purchases; also, the expansion was overstated
due to a working day effect. However, in the
first half of 1997, private consumption ex-
panded at a healthy pace. In spite of the new
temporary Euro-tax and a slightly falling num-
ber of employees real disposable incomes grew
markedly because wages advanced consider-
ably. Investment declined against the back-
ground of low capacity utilization and un-
favorable profit expectations. Furthermore, real
interest rates were still high. In spite of the
strong expansion of economic activity abroad,
exports remained weak reflecting the deterio-
rated competitiveness of firms; in part, this was
due to a marked increase of wages.
The labor market situation has deteriorated
since the beginning of the year. By the summer,
the unemployment rate rose to around 12.5 per-
cent, from 12 percent in the year before. In-
flation slowed down to only 1.5 percent. This
reduction is largely the result of the restrictive
monetary policy. Last year, however, the cen-
tral bank started to loosen its course somewhat.
Key interest rates were successively reduced,
and money market rates fell substantially.
Consequently, monetary aggregates have in-
creased markedly. Further small cuts in interest
rates are likely in the coming months because
inflation has come down considerably and the10
lira has been stable against other European cur-
rencies. After a positive decision on Italy's
participation in EMU next spring, the Banca
d'Italia will be able to cut short-term rates
drastically to the level prevailing then in Ger-
many. This will have a strong impact on eco-
nomic activity already in 1998 but mainly in
the following year.
The Italian government makes big efforts
this year to limit the total budget deficit to
3 percent of GDP in 1997. The measures in-
clude expenditure cuts, tax increases, account-
ing measures and postponing of payments. It re-
mains questionable, however, whether the
measures planned will be sufficient to achieve
the target of 3 percent. Next year, it will be all
the more difficult to achieve the target because
one-off measures like the postponement of
payments cannot easily be repeated. Further-
more, the Euro-tax is only temporary. But there
will also be some relief for the deficit because
the marked fall in interest rates implies a sub-
stantial reduction of interest payments. How-
ever, in order to achieve a sustainable fiscal
consolidation as required by the Maastricht
Treaty, cuts in pension benefits seem to be
invevitable. Altogether, fiscal policy will be
neutral in 1998.
In the coming months, the recovery will gain
some momentum. Exports will be stimulated by
the rapid expansion of economic activity in
main trading partner countries. Investment in
machinery and equipment will pick up because
of improved profit expectations and a better
capacity utilization next year. Private consump-
tion will rise due to the slightly higher numbers
of employees. There will be no drop in the
demand for cars because the government has
prolonged the subsidization scheme for the
purchase of new cars.
Real GDP will rise by a little less than
1.5 percent in 1997; thus, Italy will trail behind
Europe's recovery. Next year, however, GDP
growth will strengthen to the average European
level of 3 percent. Inflation will accelerate
moderately in the near future. The increase of
the CPI will be about 2 percent this year, and
some 2.5 percent in 1998.
VIII. Strong Upswing in the United Kingdom
The United Kingdom is in the sixth year of the
recovery. In the first half of 1997, GDP growth
remained strong. Private consumption grew
rapidly against the background of increasing
employment: The^ unemployment rate declined
to around 5.5 percent, which is about 2 per-
centage points lower than a year ago. Invest-
ment in machinery and equipment accelerated
during recent months reflecting favorable profit
expectations. In the manufacturing sector, how-
ever, the appreciation of the pound Sterling has
dampened sales expectations of firms.
Inflation has accelerated in recent months.
The year-over-year increase in the retail prices
(excluding mortgage interest payments)
amounted to almost 3 percent in September,
thus exceeding the rate of 2.5 percent targeted
by the central bank slightly. Since it was
granted independence in May, the Bank of Eng-
land raised key interest rates in several steps
from 6.25 % to 7 %. According to statements
by the Bank of England, the actual level of
interest rates should be consistent with the
inflation target in the immediate future (Bank
of England 1997). Further tentative interest
hikes, however, will probably be necessary to
get the retail price index down to the target
value in view of the strong external demand
and the fading effect of the appreciation of the
pound Sterling. Thus, impulses from monetary
policy will decrease in the coming months; in
1998, the policy stance will be roughly neutral.
The new government did not change the
general course of fiscal consolidation after the
election in May. However, there has been some
change in detail. For example, the government
launched a program aimed at reducing long-
term unemployment and joblessness among
young people. Also, the corporate tax rate was11
lowered to stimulate investment. Next year,
fiscal policy will be slightly expansionary.
Over the forecast period, the upswing will
lose some momentum. Despite the rapid ex-
pansion of economic activity abroad, exports
will slow down due to the negative effects of
the appreciation of the pound Sterling. Dom-
estic demand will also decelerate somewhat
because of the decreasing impulses of monetary
policy. A strong increase in real disposable in-
come reflecting healthy employment gains will
more than compensate the dampening impact
stemming from the rise in mortgage rates on
the expenditures of households. As a result,
private consumption will increase substantially.
Furthermore, investment in machinery and
equipment will expand rapidly as the rate of
capacity utilization is high and the profit and
sales expectations remain favorable. All in all,
real GDP will increase by almost 3.5 percent in
1997; the growth rate will slow down to around
2.5 percent in 1998.
Inflation will accelerate slightly as the ex-
pansionary monetary policy pursued over an
extended period will show effects. Retail prices
will increase by 3 percent this year and 3.5 per-
cent in 1998.
IX. High Unemployment in Europe — Is Monetary Policy too Tight?
Unemployment in EU-countries remains at a
stubbornly high level, in a number of econ-
omies it even reached new record highs. In
contrast, unemployment in the United States
has declined considerably and in 1997 reached
its lowest level in the past three decades. Also,
the recovery in the United States was stronger
than that in Europe. It is often argued that the
policy of European central banks — led by the
Deutsche Bundesbank — has been unduly re-
strictive thus contributing to the sluggish
recovery and to the persistently high unemploy-
ment. In order to examine this argument, we
take a closer look at various indicators of mon-
etary policy.
Interest Rates in Europe Suggest Expansionary
Course
The behavior of short-term interest rates
2 gives
some information on the stance of monetary
policy. The reference here is the real rate, i.e.,
the nominal money market rate minus the cur-
rent inflation rate. The average real interest
level varies across the five countries under con-
sideration (Figure 2). In the period 1984-1996,
i.e., over more than just one business cycle, it
amounted to some 3 % in the United States and
in Germany. In the UK and in France, the short-
term real interest rate averaged somewhat more
than 5 % while it was a little above 6 % in
Italy. The fact that the average is substantially
higher in these three countries than in the
United States and in Germany mainly reflects
the exchange rate orientation of the respective
central banks.
3 In order to judge the present
stance of monetary policy, we look at the
current level of real interest rates relative to the
respective average. Evidently, real rates in
Europe are at the present considerably below
average. In Germany, the difference is about
two, in France even three percentage points.
This indicates an expansionary course of mon-
etary policy. While the situation in the United
Kingdom is similar, the stance in Italy is
probably only slightly stimulative. As far as the
United States are concerned, the Fed shifted to
a more or less neutral course already in 1994.
Since then, the real rate has been close to the
average.
A similar picture arises if the term spread is
used as an indicator. Over a longer time span,
bond yields are usually higher than short-term
interest rates because investors demand a
higher risk premium for periods further into the
future. In judging the current stance of policy,
the relevant indicator is the deviation of the
interest differential from its average, which cor-
responds to a neutral monetary policy.
4 In the
period 1984-1996, the difference between
long-term and short-term interest rates was12
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quite different in the five countries. While it
averaged almost 2 percentage points in the
United States, it was — often considerably —
lower in the European economies (Figure 2).
Such differences may be due to the different
maturities of the bonds included in the average
yields. It is, however, also important that a
few central banks often raised key rates sub-
stantially to defend their exchange rates; con-
sequently, short-term rates were — as de-
scribed above — relatively high, and thus the
difference between long-term and short-term
rates was relatively small. In the middle of
1997, the term spread in France and Germany
was considerably above the long-run average,
namely by more than one percentage point,
indicating an expansionary policy. However,
the value for the United States was somewhat
lower than the average suggesting a neutral or
even slightly restrictive course. To summarize:
Neither the real short-term interest rates nor the
interest differentials indicate that monetary pol-
icy in Western Europe has been restrictive in
the recent past.
The Policy Stance According to the Taylor Rule
Central banks obviously look at several macro-
economic indicators when setting the short-
term interest rate. This can be shown, for ex-
ample, in estimates of reaction functions
(Solveen 1997). The Taylor rule
5 can be used
to analyze whether European central banks
have been focusing more than usual on fighting
inflation and thus have depressed economic
activity. This equation describes the interest
rate behavior of a central bank that tries to
stabilize output and, at the same time, to
achieve a target for the inflation rate. Ac-
cording to this rule, the market rate is relatively
low if actual output is below potential output or
if the inflation rate is low compared to the
central bank's inflation target
6 (see Box).
Figure 3 shows the rate calculated on the
basis of the rule and the actual money market
rate. In the United States, the central bank
stimulated economic activity in the early 1990s,
i.e., the rate fell well below the rate according
to the Taylor rule. However, already in 1994
According to the Taylor Rule, the nominal money
market rate i is as follows:
i = i'r +n<- 0.5(GDP








= equilibrium real interest rate
= expected inflation rate
= real GDP at normal capacity
utilization
= actual GDP
= actual inflation rate
= target inflation rate
In calculating the rate i, the average real interest
rate for the period 1984-1996 is set equal to the
equilibrium real interest rate. The expected in-
flation rate is approximated with the trend com-
ponent of the Hodrick-Prescott filter (Kramer
1996). Normal capacity utilization is also cal-
culated with the Hodrick-Prescott filter. The value
for the inflation target is 3 percent for the United
States and for Italy, 2 percent for Germany and for
France, and 2.5 percent for the United Kingdom.
the course was "corrected", and since then
there has hardly been a discrepancy; this in-
dicates a neutral course of the Fed. In Germany,
the actual rate has been lower than the rate
derived from the rule already since 1993.
Recently, the difference has even become
bigger indicating that monetary policy has be-
come more expansionary.
The situation is somewhat different in Italy
and in France. The central banks in both coun-
tries obviously had to "accept" a higher interest
rate in order to stabilize their currencies against
the D-Mark.
7 Therefore, the money market rate
was, on average, quite high. The difference
between the rate according to the Taylor rule
and the actual rate may therefore be misleading,
the policy appears to be very expansionary.
However, in 1994/95, the policy in France was
probably not giving any stimulus to economic
activity. But beginning in 1996, the French
central bank successively reduced the money
market rate to the level prevailing in Germany.
Currently, the rate is much lower than the
interest rate calculated on the basis of the rule.
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aMoney market rate that would prevail in the case of central banks acting according to the Taylor rule. — °3-month money
market rate.15
Figure 4 — Consumer Price Inflation in Major Industrial Countries, 1980-1997
Percentage change over previous year
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To summarize: According to the Taylor rule,
which explicitly includes a "corrective reaction"
to business cycle conditions, the policy in
Europe cannot be judged as restrictive. Were
the rule to be followed in the future, interest
rates would have to be raised considerably be-
cause of the expected rise in capacity utilization
and the slight increase of inflation. In the ab-
sence of such moves, the course of monetary
policy would become even more expansionary.
Comparable Disinflation in the United States
and in Western Europe
It is often stated that there exists a negative
relationship between inflation and unemploy-
ment. The "Phillips curve" implies that a reduc-
tion of inflation leads to higher unemployment.
If there was such a policy conflict and if the
increase in unemployment could be explained
with this hypothesis, one should observe that
the reduction of inflation in Europe was
relatively strong. However, the decline of in-
flation in the United States was as large as that
in Western European countries in the 1990s;
the same applies to the upswing period in
the early 1980s (Figure 4). Particularly striking
in this regard is the fact that in the United
Kingdom the disinflation was more pronounced
than in most other European countries; never-
theless, British unemployment declined where-
as it increased, for example, in Germany,
France and Italy. This observation does not
support the notion that the disinflationary
course of European central banks — led sup-
posedly by the strict policy of the Deutsche
Bundesbank — was more pronounced than that
of the United States Fed.
To summarize: The available indicators show
that monetary policy cannot be made respon-
sible for the different evolution of unemploy-
ment in various countries. There must be other
factors that explain the trend behavior of em-
ployment in the 1990s and in other periods.16
X. Comprehensive Reforms Necessary to Reduce Unemployment
For several decades, unemployment displayed
strikingly different trends in industrial coun-
tries. As far as the period since 1980 is con-
cerned, the United States stands out: The trend
of unemployment, as measured by the OECD-
standardized rate, declined throughout the
period. In the summer of 1997, unemployment
leveled off at 5 percent, which is approximately
the same rate as in 1970 and well below its
level in 1980 (Figure 5). The rises in unem-
ployment that occurred during the recessions in
the early 1980s and 1990s were corrected in the
following upswings so that full employment
was achieved. On the negative side, unemploy-
ment in Western Europe followed an upward
trend resulting in an approximate doubling of
the unemployment rate since 1980. While the
increase owing to the recessions was in line
with cyclical trends in the United States, em-
ployment gains in the successive upswings
were much less pronounced resulting in an
ever-increasing hard core of unemployment.
The different behavior in unemployment
were associated with different trends in total
employment. In the United States, 27.4 million
jobs were created between 1980 and 1996; this
is an average annual rate of increase of 1.5 per-
cent (Table 5). At the same time, the working-
age population grew by 22.6 million persons
(0.9 percent per year). While the United States
economy "delivered" 121 jobs for every 100
additional potential workers between 1980 und
1996, it was only 23 on average in Western
Europe: The increase in employment by 3.6
million jobs (0.2 percent per year) was as-
sociated with an increase in the working-age
population of nearly 16 million persons.
Figure 5 — Unemployment Rate in the United States and
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 cAbsolute change in employment as a percentage of
labor force, 1980-1996. — "European Union, excluding Eastern Germany.
Source: OECD (1997b), own calculations.17
While this is true for Western Europe as a
whole, there are significant differences in labor
market trends across countries. Unemployment
is continuing an upward trend in Germany,
France and Italy, for example, but the under-
lying trend in the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands has clearly been moving down-
ward since the mid-1980s (Figure 6). Recently,
a strong reduction of unemployment could also
be observed in Denmark and Spain. Because
this evolution has started only recently, it is,
however, not yet clear to which extent the
reduction of unemployment exceeds the usual
cyclical pattern and can be judged as structural.
The level and the trend of structural unem-
ployment are determined by a number of fac-
tors that affect labor market outcomes and form
a complex web of incentives and disincentives
(Siebert 1997). Four important areas can be
identified:
9
(1) The level of real wages (including nonwage
labor costs) and (marginal) labor productivity
determine the profitability of job creation. On
the one hand, a way to improve employment
perspectives is to increase productivity through
qualification and training, or through improve-
ments in the production process. On the other
hand, real labor costs should increase at a
slower pace than productivity in order to make
the use of labor as a factor of production more
profitable and thus increase labor demand.
Moreover, it is important that wages to a
greater extent reflect the relative scarcity of
labor across regions and sectors as well as
qualifications. Total labor costs should also in-
clude nonwage labor costs, such as employers'
contributions to social security, costs related to
sickness pay, severance pay, and the like. By
introducing measures to lower these costs, e.g.,
appropriate social security reforms, economic
policy can contribute to higher employment.
(2) Unemployment benefits and other transfers
related to unemployment essentially determine
the reservation wage, i.e., the wage rate neces-
sary to make an unemployed person accept a
job offer. As a consequence, transfers can ef-
fectively define the floor of the wage structure,
particularly in a system where wage income is
to a large extent implicitly taxed away through
the reduction of benefits. In many cases, the
system of income taxation and income-tested
benefits leads to a situation where accepting a
low-wage job only marginally increases house-
hold income.
1
0 A high reservation wage re-
duces the potential for wage differentiation, and
low-skilled workers may be priced out of the
market. The situation can be improved by re-
ducing the implicit taxation of wage income,
which, in effect, increases the net wage rate and
improves the incentives to work. A different
approach to raise the incentives for unemployed
persons to accept job offers lies in tightening
eligibility criteria of unemployment-related
benefits, or in lowering the level of benefits in
general.
(3) In many cases, potential job contracts do
not materialize due to legal or other institu-
tional restrictions. The freedom of contract is
limited through a host of regulations, including
official minimum wages and extension of labor
contracts negotiated by labor unions and em-
ployers' associations to unorganized market
participants. These regulations prevent that un-
employed persons can price themselves into
the market by accepting lower wages or by
voluntarily foregoing nonwage benefits, and
thus effectively protect job holders ("insiders")
from unwelcome competition (through "out-
siders"). They are a major factor behind the
growing incidence of long-term unemployment.
The labor market can be vitalized by market-
oriented reforms of the labor market con-
stitution (freedom of contract, competition) as
opposed to the corporativistic structure of labor
markets prevailing in Europe (Soltwedel 1997).
(4) The concert of various product market
regulations hampers the rise of new enterprises
and job creation. What is needed are supply
side reforms that are capable of increasing
the growth potential of the economy. Such
measures should include a reduction of the gov-
ernment share in the economy and a reduction
of distortions through reforms in the tax
system.18
Figure 6 — Unemployment Rates in Selected Western European Countries, 1980-1998
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A detailed analysis of developments in the
countries displaying a relatively favorable labor
market performance reveals that significant
progress has been made in the above-mentioned
fields (see also OECD 1997c):
- In the United Kingdom, comprehensive eco-
nomic reforms started already at the end of the
1970s. They included extensive privatization of
nationalized companies and a massive trans-
formation of labor market institutions including
legal provisions concerning labor unions. Com-
petition increased markedly on both product
and labor markets, one result of these changes
was an increase of wage differentiation.
- In the Netherlands, beginning in the early
1980s, the focus was on curtailing labor costs
by wage moderation and by dampening the in-
crease in social security contributions. An im-
portant aspect of the Dutch labor market is the
rising share of part-time jobs. As a result, the
number of employed outpaced the number of
hours worked to a significant degree.* *
- In Denmark, policies to promote employment
included increasing competition on product
markets (privatization, liberalization of shop-
opening hours), reducing the level of benefits
somewhat (although they remain on extremely
high levels), and tightening eligibility criteria.
Much of the reduction in unemployment has,
however, been due to active labor market pol-
icies. In addition, several paid leave and early
retirement schemes led to a significant reduc-
tion of the labor force. Such policies, however,
do not increase employment, and in view of
high budgetary costs it must be doubted that
they are capable of reducing unemployment
permanently.
- In Spain, the unemployment rate approached
25 percent in 1994 — the highest level in the
OECD-area. Throughout the 1990s, the very
restrictive employment protection rules that had
been in place were successively loosened. This
policy increased labor market flexibility and, in
concert with pronounced wage moderation,
should have contributed significantly to the fast
employment growth that can be observed in the
current upswing.
Summing up, the experiences of the coun-
tries show that there are several measures to
improve the labor market performance. Most
promising is a combination of policies reflect-
ing the specific situation of the country. More-
over, reforms in different fields should be im-
plemented simultaneously since there seem to
be important synergies between structural re-




The example of countries with improved
labor market outcomes — New Zealand and
Ireland should be added to the countries
discussed above — leads to the conclusion that
policies are most likely to be effective when a
large part of the population is exposed to struc-
tural reform. It is not sufficient to introduce
specific provisions for small groups, e.g., the
long-term unemployed. The rules of the game
have to be altered for everyone, including the
employed.20
Endnotes
1 The section Germany is largely based on Boss etal. (1997).
2 A comparison of money growth is less instructive because of the apparent instability of money demand functions in a
number of countries. Therefore, we look at short-term interest rates, which are largely controlled by the central banks.
' In order to keep the exchange rate stable vis-a-vis the D-Mark, Italy and France had to accept higher real interest rates
because the markets obviously put a risk premium on their currencies. From time to time, interest rates were raised
substantially in these countries to counter speculative attacks, for example, in the fall of 1992 and in the spring of 1995,
when there were crises in the EMS.
4 According to (almost) all business cycle theories, monetary policy does not have real effects in the long run. The average
over a long period therefore reflects a neutral stance of monetary policy.
^ The rule is named after John B. Taylor, who advocated such a policy in a number of publications. This rule can be
viewed as a compromise between targeting inflation on the one hand and stabilizing output on the other (Taylor 1993).
^ In some countries, there is an explicit inflation target. This may be constant over time, as in Germany or it may change
like in the United Kingdom. The Banca d'Italia does not pursue a particular target. The "equilibrium" real interest rate is
the rate that is neutral with respect to output; here, the average for the period 1984-1996 serves as a proxy.
7 In the countries that could keep the exchange rates stable in the EMS without major problems, the course of monetary
policy is comparable to that in Germany; this applies, for example, to Belgium, Austria, and the Netherlands.
° For the United Kingdom, there is a similar problem of the "correct" level because the real rate was, on average, quite
high in the past. Accordingly, the policy of the Bank of England appears quite expansionary.
9 In a comprehensive study on industrialized countries' labor markets, the OECD (1994) published recommendations for
policies that should be implemented to improve the labor market performance. The proposals for a "jobs strategy" are
broadly in line with what is discussed here.
' 0 For an analysis of the German case see Deutsche Bundesbank (1996) and Gern (1996).
1' The share of part-time employed in total employment has increased rapidly since the early 1980s to 35 percent and is the
highest among the industrial countries.
*
2 For example, the level of replacement rates affecting labor supply also influences the level of nonwage labor costs that
have an effect on labor demand.21
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